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CORPORATIONS -

JURISDICTION -

FOREIGN CoRPORATIONS AND

VENUE IN THE FEDERAL CouRTS - CONSENT TO BE SUED - In the
long history of the struggle to hold foreign corporations subject to
suit at the place of their business activity/ another chapter was written
when the Supreme Court decided N eirbo Company v. Bethleheni Shipbuilding Co1·p., Ltd.,2 hereinafter referred to as the Neirbo case. In
that case the plaintiffs, who were citizens and residents of New Jersey,
had brought an action in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York and had sought and obtained the addition, as a party defendant, of Bethlehem, a Deleware corporation.
Since, as between plaintiffs and Bethlehem, the suit had not been
brought in the district of residence either of the plaintiff or defendant,
as provided in section 5r of the Judicial Code,3 the latter's objection to
the maintenance of the action as against it was upheld in the lowet'.
courts. However, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court of appeals 4 and held that by appointing an agent for service
of process in compliance with the New York statute/ Bethlehem had
"consented to be sued?' in that state and thus had waived its federal
venue privilege.
The opinion presents several factors for consideration. Among
these are: ( r) the failure of the Court to distinguish venue from jurisdiction of the person secured by service of process; (2) the reliance
of the Court upon a fictional "consent to be sued"; (3) the action of
the Court in finding a waiver of venu!! in a federal court in an act of
compliance with a. state statute; (4) the effect of the decision on the
federal venue statute; and (5) the method of approa~h to the problem.
1 See HENDERSON, Pos1noN OF FoREIGN CoRPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CoNsnTU'I'IONAL LAW, c. 5, p. 77 ff. (1918); l OHLINGER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 547 ff. (1938);
Culp, "Constitutional Problems Arising from Service of Process in Foreign Corporations," 19 MINN. L. REV. 375 (1935); Fead, "Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations," 24- M1cH. L. REV. 633 (1926); Farrier, "Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations," 17 MINN. L. REV. 270 (1933); Rothschild, "Jurisdiction of Foreign Corporations in Personam," 17 VA. L. REv. 129 (1930); Cahill, "Jurisdiction over Foreign
Corporations and Individuals who Carry on Business within the Territory," 30 HARv.
L. REV. 676 (1917); Scott, "Jurisdiction over Nonresidents Doing Business within a
State," 32 HARV. L. REv. 871 (1919).
2 308 U.S. 165, 60 S. Ct. 153 (1939). Justice Roberts wrote a dissenting opinion
in which Chief Justice Hughes and Justice McReynolds joined. The case has been
discussed in 7 UNiv. CHI. L. REV. 397 (1940); 25 CoRN. L. Q. 291 (1940); 53
HARV. L. REV. 600 (194-0); 49 YALE L. J. 724 (1940); 1·s N. c. L. REV. 232
(1940); 28 CAL. L. REV. 396 (1940).
3 l Stat. L. 79 (1789), as amended, 28 U.S. C. (Supp. 1938), § 112.
~ (C. C. A. 2d, 1939) 103 F. (2d) 765. Cf. Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., (C. C. A. 10th, 1938) 100 F. (2d) 770.
5 N. Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1929), "General Corporation Law," § 210.
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I.

The authority of a particular court to proceed with a particular
lawsuit of a civil nature rests in four main incidents: jurisdiction of the
subject matter, jurisdiction of the person of the defendant if a personal
judgment is sought, venue, and, in proceedings in rem, jurisdiction of
the res. 6 The Court in the case under discussion properly ignored the
last-named incident, since a personal judgment upon a transitory cause
of action was sought. It went on to distinguish correctly, in one aspect,
jurisdiction of the subject matter from venue, but nowhere did the
Court distinguish jurisdiction over the person secured through service
of process from the other incidents of the authority to proceed with
a suit-particularly venue. Of course it is recognized that there was no
problem in the N eirbo case depending upon service of process, but
neither was there any problem with respect to jurisdiction of the subject matter. The absence of reference to jurisdiction of the person is the
more remarkable in that it is exceedingly doubtful whether the Court's
·reasoning, in finding a waiver of the venue priyilege in the appointment
of an agent to receive service of process, could have survived any detailed analysis of the concepts of venue and jurisdiction of the person
with the distinctions between these two properly drawn. The Court,
throughout the opinion, took refuge in such dichotomic generalizations
as "suability" and "consent to be sued." It is very important in all cases
of this character to dissect any such statement as that a corporation or
any party "consents to be sued" or is "subject to suit" or "suable" in
a given place, for there are two concepts involved. One is juri~diction
over the person, the other is venue.7 Venue does not relate to the
power to bring a litigant into court or authorize a court to render a
binding in personam judgment, but rather relates to the particular
unit of a court where a specific suit shall be brought, i.e., the place of
trial. It is not a foregone conclusion that the fact that a party is subject
to service of process in a locality should destroy his privilege of venue;
but that is apparently the effect of the opinion in the Nierbo case with
respect to foreign corporations, at least in connection with causes of
action arising where business is transacted. The Court should in any
event postulate and consider the policy factors involved. These would
presumably include trial convenience, efficiency of the judicial process,
economic welfare and development, and the status of the organization
of the federal court system.
For a discussion of these incidents and the distinctions between them, see
542-543 (1938).
7 Robertson v. Railroad Labor Board, 268 U. S. 619, 45 S. Ct. 621 (1925);
New York Indemnity Co. v. Rasmusson, (D. C. Tex. 1932) I F. Supp. 156; American Indemnity Co. v. Detroit Fidelity & Surety Co., (D. C. Tex. 1932) l F. Supp.
160.
6

I 0HLlNGER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
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2.

Venue requirements may be satisfied either by compliance with the
statute or through waiver of the venue privilege by the defendant.s
Admitting that the statute was not complied with in the present case,
the Court relied on the premise that venue is a privilege, which may
be lost. It was further stated that the privilege may be lost by failure
to assert it seasonably, by formal submission, or submission through
conduct. To this statement was cited Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v.
Consolidated Stone Co.0 That case was one where the privilege was lost
through failure to assert it seasonably;• the defendant there tried to
raise the point after permitting judgment to go by default and it was
held he could not do so. The case seems inappropriately cited, both
because under the reasoning of the Nierbo case a foreign corporation
would never be permitted to assert the privilege and because no general
sta_te?1ent of the sort to which the case was cited appears in the earlier
op1mon.
The N eirbo case is based, of course, on the third of the abovementioned ways of waiving the venue privilege, i.e., by submission
through conduct. The conduct is the doing business within the state
wherein is situated the district in which suit is brought and the appointment of an agent for the receipt of service of process in accordance
with the state statute. The Court reasoned that by virtue of such conduct the corporation "consented to be sued."
·
There is, of course, as great an inherent fallacy in ascribing to a
corporation powers of volition as there is in ascribing to it powers of
mobi1ity, which latter concept the Court admitted to be metaphorical.
A corporation can no more "consent to be sued'' than it can "move"
into another state.
Nor does anyone, with the possible exception of parties to friendly
or "test" cases, ever consent to be sued. The concept of a party consenting to be sued brings to mind the now discredited theory, prevalent
in the last century, that a person who committed a crime thereby contracted with the state for imprisonment. All that can be found in these
situations is the voluntary performance of some act which the courts
use as a basis for satisfying the various requirements necessary to
authorize a court to render a binding judgment against a party. The
Court, in the N eirbo case, looked for no expression of volition. And it
is doubtful if it would have availed the corporation there to have
expressly denied that it was waiving its federal venue privilege at the
s General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. R., 260 U. S. 261, 43 S.
Ct. 106 (1922).
0 278 U.S. 177, 49 S. Ct. 98 (1928).
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time it appointed its agent under the state statute.10 In fact, at another
point in its opinion, the Court stated that the essence of the matter
is that courts affix to conduct consequences as to place of suit consistent
with the policy of section SI of the Judicial Code, and thus seemed to
negate its position that the result depended on defendant's consent to
be sued. The continued use of the :fiction of consent can only lead to
confusion of legal thinking and supports no policy which cannot be
given effect through reasoning more closely related to fact.
A substantial coherency supports the position that a foreign corporation by doing business in a state, where by statute it is required
that such corporations appoint agents to receive service of process, and
by appointing an agent for the service of process, consents that proper
service upon such an agent, of process issuing from either the state or
federal courts,11 will constitute service on the corporation; and this
even though the corporation continuously objects to such a procedure
and ostensibly decries ever giving real consent. But where the statute
complied with makes no reference to venue, not even in the state
courts 12 much less in the federal, a finding by the Court that by doing
business in the state the corporation has waived its venue privilege in
the federal courts by "consenting to be sued" is to "exhibit no very keen
understanding of business psychology'' 13 and to strain the meaning of
words till they lose their significance.
10 Such assertions might possibly save foreign corporations from the operation of .
the decision in the Neirbo case and might also serve to compel the Court to leave its
basis of fictional consent.
It would also seem that any corporations which could avoid appointing agents
in compliance with state laws would be saved from the operation of the decision in
the Neirbo case. See the distinction made between that case and the Shaw and Keasbey
cases. 308 U. S. at 173, note 15. See also, infra, at notes 34 and 35.
11 That service of process in the manner prescribed by the law of the state in
which service is made will confer jurisdiction of the person upon the federal courts
is now expressly provided in Rules of Civil Procedure for United States District Courts,
Rule 4 (d) (7) (1938). A more difficult question is presented where the agent designated is a state official and there is within the state no other agent of the corporation
who might properly be served with process. See infra, p. I052.
12 In this respect the Neirbo case might be distinguished from Oklahoma Packing
Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., (C. C. A. rnth, 1938) 100 F. (2d) 770. The
Oklahoma statute, Okla. Stat. (1931), § 130, in addition to providing for service opon
an agent who is to reside at the state capital, provides that suit may be maintained
in any county where an agent of the corporation may be found or where the cause of
action arose. The New York statute, "General Corporation Law," § 210, has no such
provision. It is, however, doubtful whether the result, as a practical matter, can he
permitted to vary with the state statute.
13 HENDERSON, POSITION OF FOREIGN CoRPORATIONS 1N AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 90 (1938).
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3.
Another problem the Court faced in the Nierbo case was finding
satisfaction of the federal venue requirement in compliance with a
state statute. The solution of that problem was made easier by the fact
that such a step had already been taken in Ex parte Schollenberger 14
( on which the Court in the Nierbo case mainly relied throughout the
opinion). In that earlier case the Court had said:
"It was insisted in argument that the statute confines the right of
suit to the courts of the State; but we cannot so construe it. There
is nothing to manifest such an intention; and, as the object of the
legislature evidently was to relieve the citizens of Pennsylvania
from the necessity of going outside of the State to seek judicial
redress upon their contracts made with foreign insurance companies, it is but reasonable to suppose that they were entirely at
liberty to select the court in the State having jurisdiction of the
subject-matter, which in their judgment, was the most convenient
and desirable. As the company, if sued in a State court, could remove the cause to the Circuit Court, and thus compel a citizen of
the State to submit to that jurisdiction, we see no reason why the
citizen may not, if he desires it, bring the company into the same
jurisdiction at the outset. While the Circuit Court may not be
technically a court of the Commonwealth, it is a. court within it;
and that, as we think, is all the legislature intended to provide
for." is
Again, in the N eirbo case, the Court denied it was subjecting federal
procedure to the requirements of state law and, quoting from the
Schollenberger case, asserted that it was merely recognizing that "state
legislation and consent of parties may bring about a. state of facts which
will authorize the courts of the United States to take cognizance of a
case." 10 But it might be said that when a federal statute covers the
situation the fact that its application will lead to a negative result should
not permit the Court to look to the state statute and a :fictional
consent to get an affirmative result which it deems desirable.
A view contrary to that in the Schollenberger case had been taken
by Justice Nelson, while on circuit, in deciding Pomeroy v. New York
& N. H. R. R.11 In that case a Connecticut corporation extended its
96 U. $, 369 (1877),
Ibid., at 376-377.
16 308 U. S. at 175.
11 (C. C. N. Y. 1857) 4 Blatchf.
H

15

120,

F. Cas. No.

II,261.
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line of .railroad into New York by virtue of a statute of that state
which provided that the corporation should be subject to suit therein
and that process might be served upon an agent or officer of the cor.:.
poration. It was there said:
"The corporation is still a Connecticut company, resident within
the state of Connecticut, but consenting to be sued in New York
by service of process on its agent; and, however_ effectual this service may be in conferring jurisdiction over the company, upon
tribunals governed by the laws of New York, it cannot have that
effect in respect to the federal tribunals, which are not only not
governed by the state laws, but are governed by the act of congress, which has prescribed a different rule." 18
The Court in the Schollenberger case referred to the Pomeroy case
as in conflict with the rule established in Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v.
Htl'Mis,19 but the Harris case involved a suit brought in the District
of Columbia and there was present no problem of the interrelation of
state and federal courts and statutes. In Knott v. Southern Life Insurance Co.,20 a circuit court case, a result similar to that in the Schollenberger case was reached, although the Alabama statute there involved
referred generally to service of process whereas the Pennsylvania
statute referred to "proceedings brought in any court of this Commonwealth."
Also of interest is the decision in the Schollenberger case that process issuing from a federal court might properly be served upon an
agent appointed for service of process in compliance with a state statute.
Of course, if such agent otherwise occupied such a relationship to the
corporation that he might properly be served, the!,'"e is no point to be
made; but if that were not the case (as for example where the agent
is some state official), it would appear that the federal court was bringing within its jurisdiction, by virtue of a state statute, a party not
otherwise subject to that jurisdiction, particularly if there is within
the state no other agent of the corporation who might properly be
served with process. However, where a foreign corporation constantly
maintains a large plant and staff within a state so there is no doubt
that service could easily be made on a responsible officer or agent of
the corporation, it would seem immaterial that service was actually
made on a person not otherwise connected with the corporation than by
virtue .of his designation as agent to receive process, especially in view
18 lbid.

Wall. (79 U. S.) 65 (1870).
(C. C. Ala. 1874) 2 Woods 479, F. Cas. No. 7894.

19 12
20

1940 J
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of the required precautions that actual notice reach the proper officials
of the corporation.
It is interesting in this connection to note that with respect to attachment proceedings the other result has been reached. That is,
submission to jurisdiction of a federal court cannot be secured by the
attachment of property of a non-resident even though a state statute
provides for proceedings begun by the attachment of property without
personal service.2 1.
It has been suggested also that the position of the Court in finding
waiver of venue in compliance with the state act is open to attack on
grounds of general agency principles-that the agent appointed to
receive service of process is a special agent whose authority does not
e:},,.i:end beyond receiving service of process from the state courts; therefore, the act of appointing him cannot be construed as a waiver of the
venue privilege in the federal courts. The Court's answer to this would
be that the agent does not waive the venue privilege, so the extent of
his authority is immaterial; rather it is the act of the corporation in
appointing the agent which is construed as a waiver of the venue
privilege. This answer, however, is not wholly satisfactory. As pointed
out above, the Court takes such generalizations as "consent to be used''
or "suability" and treats them as a sort of "litigation grinder" into one
end of which is fed a consent to be served with process and out of the
other end of which comes a waiver of the venue privilege. As a matter of
fact the corporation does not even "consent" to the exercise of that personal jurisdiction secured by service of process; it merely designates a
person on whom service may be made, and that is not the same as voluntary appearance in court. Process must still be served in accordance with
the statute or the court does not secure jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant. The mere act of appointment does not even constitute
a waiver of ·the requirements of proper service, yet the Court here
carries it over to an entirely different concept. It is interesting to speculate whether other privileges of the corporation are also waived by
appointing an agent to receive service of process. It would be absurd
to suggest, for example, that jury trial had been waived if the plaintiff
chose not to have a jury. Yet this, also, is an incident of litigation which
may be waived. From this it would appear that the Court was not
justified in finding, in circumstances fulfilling the requirements of one
incident of litigation, the waiver of another and separate incident.
21 Big Vein Coal Co. v. Read, 229 U. S. 3r, 33 S. Ct. 694 (r9r3); Allen v.
Clark, (D. C. Cal. r938) 22 F. Supp. 898; Day v. Newark India-Rubber Mfg. Co.,
(C. C. N. Y. r850) r Blatchf. 628, F. Cas. No. 3685.
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4.
Another consideration is the e:ffect of the decision in the N eirbo case
on the federal venue statute, section 5r of the Judicial Code. Congress,
in enacting the pertinent part of the statute, drew no distinction between
foreign corporations and other parties. The Court made that distinction
in the N eirbo case. The fact that Congress in another portion of the
same section has enacted a special provision for stockholders' actions 22
is evidence of the fact that generally it considered corporations to be
subject to and privileged to the same venue provisions as other parties.
It may also be questioned whether the Court should make the locale
of business activity a basis for proper venue when Congress has not
done so in the general venue provision; the fact that it has done so in
special cases 28 would indicate that it had specifically refrained from
doing so in the general provision.
Further, Congress has distinguished in the venue statute between
diversity and arising ( federal question) cases. In the former the suit
may be brought either in the district of the residence of the plaintiff
or that of the defendant, while in the latter it may be brought only
in the district of the residence of the defendant. Under the doctrine of
the N eirbo case there is no such distinction with respect to foreign corporations, who may now be sued in any district where they do business
whether the suit be a diversity case or an arising case.

5.
With respect to the methodological development of the opinion
it has already been pointed out how the Court's citation of Commercial
Casualty Ins. Co. v. Consolidated Stone Co. fails in its function. 2 "
Further on the Court pointed to two cases relied on heavily in the
Schollenberger case, and in the N eirbo case as well, as recognizing that
"consent" may give venue. The first of these is Lafayette Ins. Co. v.
French.25 That case involved a suit in a federal circuit court on a judgment obtained in a court of Ohio. There was no problem of venue in
2Z In 1936, sec. 51 of the Judicial Code was amended to provide that "snit by a
stockholder on behalf of a corporation may be brought in any district in which suit
against the defendant or defendants in said stockholders' action, other than said corporation, might have been brought by such corporation••••" 49 Stat. L. 1213, 28
U. S. C. (Supp. 1938), § n2.
28 See 28 U. S. C. (1934), § 109, relating to snits for infringement of letters
patent. Many special statutes contain venue provisions relating to the place where
business is carried on, For example, Clayton Anti-Trust Act, 15 U. S. C. (1934), §
22; Bituminous Coal Act, 15 U. S. C. (Supp. 1938), § 835 (d). For a collection
of venue provisions contained in sections of the United States Code outside Title 28
(the Judicial Code), see 2 OHLINGER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 554-582 (1938).
2¼ Supra at note 9.
2 1; 18 How. (59 U. S.) 404 (1855).
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the immediate case and there could of course be no problem under the
federal venue statute in the original suit since that was in an Ohio court.
The controversy there was whether an Indian.a corporation was subject to suit in the courts of Ohio so as to entitle to full faith and credit
a judgment secured against it in those courts. All the Court did in
that case was to dispose of the ancient contention that since the corporation was created by a law of Indiana it could have no existence out of
that state and consequently could not be sued in Ohio.
The other case referred to is Railroad Company v. Harris.26 This
case involved a suit brought in the District of Columbia by a resident of
the District of Columbia against the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, a
Maryland corporation. That the case is not in point in any discussion
of venue in the federal courts within the states can no better be shown
than by quoting from the opinion.
"The jurisdiction of the court was not governed by the I rth
section of the Judiciary Act of r789. It did not depend upon the
citizenship of the parties. It was controlled by acts of Congress·
local to the district [ of Columbia]. A citizen of the district [ of
Columbia] cannot sue in the Circuit [ now district] Courts of
[within] a State." 27
The Court then considered the legislative history of the Judiciary
Act of I887 28 and concluded that the changes made in the federal
venue statute by that act did not affect the basis of the Schollenberger
decision, handed down in r877. The act of r887, it is true, retained the
result of the Schollenberger case by inserting, in lieu of the provision
that suit might be brought wherever defendant should be found, the
provision that suit, in diversity cases, might be brought in the district
of the residence of the plaintiff as well as in the district of the residence
of the defendant. An objection to the Court's method is that, while
heavily relying on the Schollenberger case in reasoning to its conclusion, it nowhere in the course of that reasoning points out that the
N eirbo case goes beyond the Schollenberger case and permits suit in a
district of which neither plaintiff nor defendant is an inhabitant.
The Court also stated that it would be a strange construction of the
act of r887 if it were held that foreign corporations were to have the
discriminatory freedom either to remain in the state courts or remove
to the federal court. It is perhaps strange to find the Court puzzling
over the construction of the statute when its apparent ratio decidendi
is that the defendant has waived any privilege it may have under the
statute, but, aside from that, the Court does not say who would be
12 Wall. (79 U. S.) 65 (1870).
7lbid., at 86 (italics supplied).
28 24 Stat. L. 552 (1887).
26
2
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discriminated against. With respect to residents of the state, it is to be
observed that the "freedom" to remain in the state courts or remove
to the federal court is merely one of the incidents of diverse citizenship
founded in the same policy which supports the jurisdiction of federal
courts based on diversity of citizenship. One of the reasons for such
jurisdiction is the antagonism in the state courts toward entities from
other states. While this antagonism may n0t be as prevailing as it
was when the federal system was first established, it would be but to
ignore fact to say that it does not exist. Such feeling becomes definitely
noticeable in periods of extreme economic depression. Of course there
is no discrimination against non-resident individuals, partnerships, or
unincorporated associations for they have exactly that freedom ( and
may be engaging in exactly the same kind of business activity). Indeed
the N eirbo case seems to discriminate in favor of such entities and
against the corporation. This is intensified by the fact that non-resident
individuals, partnerships and unincorporated associations, when sued
in state courts by a foreign corporation, may remove to the federal
court although the corporation could not bring the suit there originally.
It is recognized, of course, that the corporation is the most important
foreign business entity, both numerically and financially, but that fact
should not be allowed to handcuff the court when a proper case arises
involving some other entity. Thus it seems the kind of activity engaged
in and not the type of business organization should be the turning point
in these cases.
The Court continued, in the opinion in the N eirbo case, by citing
in support of its position five lower court cases decided since the act
of r887. In one of these 29 the federal circuit court held defendant to
be an inhabitant of the district where suit was brought ( a holding apparently inacceptable to the Court in the N eirbo case). There was no
intimation of a fictitious consent to be sued nor was there any reference
to the Schollenberger case. In two of the other cited cases 20 the district
judges seemed unaware of the fact that the act of I 887 provided that
suit might be brought in the district of the residence of the plaintiff as
well as that of the defendant. Another case 81 is stated to have been
approvingly cited in a later case.22 However, the. fact that it was approvingly cited to another point, viz., that a corporation may not
migrate from the state of its incorporation, would seem to derogate
from the effectiveness of such citation. The discussion of the foregoing
paragraph may seem to be a hypercritical descent to the trivial, but the
29 Riddle v. New York, L. E. & W. R. R., (C. C. Pa. 1889) 39 F. 290.
so Shainwald v. Davids, (D. C. Cal. 1895) 69 F. 704; Patten v. Dodge Mfg.
Corp., (D. C. Ind. 1928) 23 F. (2d) 852.
81 Consolidated Store-Service Co. v. Lamson Consolidated Store-Service Co.,
(C. C. Mass. 1890) 41 F. 833.
82 Haight & Freese Co. v. Weiss, (C. C. A. 1st, 1907) 156 F. 328.
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point to be made is that the Court apparently tried to give the impression that its reasoning is supported by a line of substantial case authority
whereas it would not seem to be justified in doing so.
The Court admitted that the weight of recent lower court authority
is opposed to the result reached; however, it was said that these cases
were based upon a dictum in Southern Pacific Co. v. Denton 33 which
was rejected in the Nierbo case.
The Court's chief trouble was in handling Shaw v. Quincy Mining
Co.3 "' and In re Keasbey & Mattison Co.35 In the Shaw case a citizen
of Massachusetts sued a Michigan corporation in New York. Proper
service was had upon an agent of the corporation but it was held that
the suit could not be maintained because the venue was improper. That
case was distinguished on the ground that the agent had not been appointed in compliance with a state statute. In In re Keasbey & Mattison Co., a federal question case, a Pennsylvania corporation sued a
Massachusetts corporation in New York. Service was had upon an
agent in New York but the suit was dismissed for lack of proper venue.
The Court said:
"But a corporation, by doing business or appointing a general
agent in a district other than that in which it is created, does not
waive its right, if seasonably availed of, to insist that the suit
should have been brought in the latter district." 36
Again the case was distinguished on the ground that designation of the
agent as one to receive service of process had not been made under
state law.
It would seem that the Court should rather have overruled these
cases. To distinguish them on the ground chosen seems not only to
negate the assertion made elsewhere in the opinion that the Court is
not subjecting procedure in the federal courts to the requirements of
state law, but also seems to put a premium on avoiding the appointment
of an agent in compliance with state law.
As pointed out above, the Court in the N eirbo case relied mainly
on E:i: parte Schollenberger 31 to support its decision, but the reasoning
of that earlier case was not adopted in its entirety. Nor, indeed, is the
result of the two cases the same. In the Schollenberger case the suit
was brought at the residence of the plaintiff so that the result of that
case is in accord with the present form of the statute, and it is not clear
that the Court in that early case would have permitted a plaintiff to
146 u. s. 202, 13 s. Ct. 44 (1892).
145 U.S. 444, 12 S. Ct. 935 (1892).
36 160 U.S. 221, 16 S. Ct. 273 (1895).
36 Ibid., 160 U. S. at 229.
37 96 u. s. 369 (1877).
as

3 "'
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bring suit where neither he nor the ·defendant resided. The Court in
the Schollenberger case reasoned that venue was a kind of jurisdiction
which could be conferred by consent; therefore, since the venue statute
required that the defendant be found in the district, the defendant
could consent to be found there and by appointing an agent for service
of process in compliance with a state statute it had consented to be
found there and thus there was compliance with the federal venue
statute. There was no explanation of how consent to be served with
process within a state resolves itself into consent to have any given
suit maintained in a particular district within that state. Any such explanation would of course bring the Court up short against the inherent
fallacy of confusing or merging jurisdiction of the person with venue.
The Court in the N eirbo case, unlike the Schollenberger case, found no
compliance with the statute by virtue of consent.38 That is, it did not
find that the defendant consented to be an inhabitant of the district
where suit was brought. Rather the Court found no necessity for applying the statute since the defendant had waived its protection. The Court
found the waiver in a consent to be sued, which in tum was found in
the act of appointing an agent for receipt of service of process. Again
there was no explanation of how a consent to receive service of process
within the state resolves itself into a consent that a specific litigation be
maintained in a particular district within the state. Further, the logic of
the Court's position would seem to compel an extension of the doctrine
of the case to authorize a suit in some other district of the same state
although the corporation was not doing business in that other district.
However, the only apparent justification for the result reached, that
an entity should be subject to suit wherever engaged in business with
respect to suits arising from that business, would not permit of such
an extension.
The real reason behind the Court's decision is apparently a feeling
that corporations should be subject to suit, in the federal as well as in
the state courts, wherever they do business. It is interesting to speculate, in this.connection, as to why the Cqurt did not hold that the act
of doing business within a district would itself amount to a consent to
waive the venue privilege with respect to suits brought in that district
and relating to the business carried on there. Such an affirmative course
of action would seem to prove just as convenient and far more logical,
as a peg on which to hang a waiver of the venue privilege, than the
appointment of an agent for receipt of service of process under a state
38 This is apparently the holding as stated in the body of the opinion. There is,
however, an inexplicable statement in note I 5 where the Court, after distinguishing
In re Keasbey & Mattison Co. on the ground that there the designation under state
law had not been made, said: "But the requirement of 'residence' in the Act of 1887
is as much satisfied by a consent to be sued as was the requirement 'to be found'
in the 1875 Act satisfied by such consent." 308 U. S. at 174, note 15.
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statute. If a state did not require the appointment by a foreign corporation of an agent for receipt of service of process,3° or if a corporation
could avoid compliance with such requirement, under the reasoning of
the N eirbo case there would be no waiver of the federal venue privilege
even though the corporation was actively engaged in business in the
district where suit was brought. In view of this, it is difficult, despite
the assertion of the Court that it is not subjecting federal procedure
to the requirements of state law, to deny the effectiveness of the state
statute in controlling the operation of venue in the federal courts.
A question raised by the N eirbo case is whether its reasoning should
be applied only to corporations. It would seem that the mere form of
business organization is not the turning point in this problem, but
rather emphasis should be put on the type of economic activity carried
on by whatever form of organization is involved.
For example, it has been held th~t a non-resident motorist who
operates his car on the highways of a state thereby appoints the secretary of state of that state as his agent for service of process,4° and with
respect to the sale of securities it has been held that an individual doing
business in another state by an agent may be served by service on that
agent.41 It would seem that if such persons are subject to suit in the
state court they should also be subject to suit in the federal court when
there is proper jurisdiction of the supject matter. A case standing in
the way of treating foreign corporations and individuals of other states
in the same way is Flexner v. F arson.4 z That case held ineffectual a
Kentucky statute which provided generally for service on agents of
absentee individuals and partnerships. Justice Holmes said:
"But the consent that is said to be implied in such cases [ service
on agent of foreign corporations] is a mere :fiction, founded upon
the accepted doctrine that the States could exclude foreign corporations altogether, and therefore could establish this obligation
as a condition to letting them in. • • • The State had no power
to exclude the defendants [ a partnership] and on that ground
without going farther the Supreme Court of Illinois rightly held
that the analogy failed and that the Kentucky judgment was
void." 48
39 Apparently only Georgia is in this category now. 1940 CoRPORATION MANUAL
403 (United States Corp. Co.). This factor is covered by paragraph 49 throughout the
manual.
40 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 632 (1927); Kane v. Ne\V Jersey,
242 U. S. 160, 37 S. Ct. 30 (1916).
41 Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623, 55 S. Ct. 553 (1935).
4 z 248 U. S. 289, 39 S. Ct. 97 (1918). In connection with this case, see Scott,
"Jurisdiction over Nonresidents Doing Business within a State," 32 HARv. L. REv.
871 (1919).
43 Flexner v. Farson, 248 U. S. 289 at 293, 39 S. Ct. 97 (1918).
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However, it must now also be recognized that although a state cannot
bar individuals who reside in other states, it may regulate their conduct in the interests of its own citizens so long as it does not discriminate
against them. A requirement that non-resident individuals, partnerships
and associations be subject to suit within the state where they do business would seem to be a proper regulation. Thus such units should be
required to appoint an agent for service of process and, if the result
of the Neirbo case is found satisfactory, should also be subject to original suit in the federal court ( since they can remove to the federal
court) when jurisdiction of the subject matter is present.
The problem the Court had before it in the N eirbo case was not an
easy one to solve. Nor is it easy to quarrel with the result reached. ·
For it is to be remembered that defendant was merely added as a party
to a suit which would otherwise have been properly brought in the
southern district of New York. Certainly trial convenience dictated that
the litigation be concluded in that one suit already started. Further,
it is not clear that the other defendants were subject to suit in Delaware, the place of Bethlehem's incorporation, and it is possible that
none of the defendants were subject to suit in New Jersey where
plaintiffs resided. On the other hand, there should be considered the
fact that plaintiffs did have recourse to the courts of New York.
It is the approach the Court took to the problem, rather than the
result, that is regrettable. It is regrettable that the Court did not
approach and solve the problem as strictly one of venue rather than
engaging in an entangling and unholy alliance with "consent to be sued"
and "suability." It is regrettable that the Court should base its result
on an obviously :fictional consent, not only because :fictions inherently
lead to confusion when extension of reasoning is called for, but because
it is fairly clear that, aside from a complete withdrawal from the picture, consent has nothing to do with the result. It is regrettable that the
Court laid such stress on compliance with a state statute, a view that
was not only unnecessary and productive of a situation whereby solution of federal venue problems is brought to the brink of the chaotic
chasm of state legislation but that may even favor those who evade
such legislation over those who comply. It is also regrettable that the
Court should feel compelled to such a degree of judicial legislation in
a field which at least nominally remains in the control of Congress. It
was perhaps regrettable that the Court should overrule a long established line of authority and introduce an element of uncertainty with
respect to a procedural point, and much more so that the Court should
strive to give the impression that it was not doing so; but this is to a
measure balanced by the fact that there can be said to be no vested
interest in procedural matters.
As suggested above, it would have been preferable for the Court
to hold that doing business within a district constitutes a waiver of the
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federal venue privilege whenever business is conducted therein, by
whatsoever type of business organization may be involved, to such an
extent as to warrant the inference that the entity has subjected itself to
the jurisdiction and la.ws prevailing in the district.<W This would exclude
the possibility of suit in some district of a multiple-district state other
than that in which business is done. It would then also be logical to
reject suits not arising out of the business transacted. Further, by
excluding reliance on state statutes, possible avenues of escape from the
N eirbo decision would be closed.
It has been pointed out that the Court might have better solved its
problem by separating residence and citizenship, thus holding a corporation to be a citizen of the state of incorporation but a resident or
inhabitant wherever it does business.45 That course, however, would not
only involve the rejection of long-established theory and decision, but,
by bringing into compliance with the venue statute suits begun where
the corporation does business, would subject the corporation to suit
by roving trouble-makers on causes of action which perhaps arose
thousands of miles away and have no relation to the business being
carried on in the locality where suit is brought. In basing its decision
upon a waiver of the venue privilege, the Court will more easily be
able to control this evil.46 Perhaps, too, the Court was unwilling to take
44 See similar language in St. Louis Southwestern R. R. v. Alexander, 227 U. S.
218 at 227, 33 S. Ct. 245 (1913).
45 See 53 HARV. L. R:1;:v. 660 at 664, 666 (1940); 49 YALE L. J. 724 at 732
(1940).
46 The Court has not been clear as to whether a foreigu corporation doing business
in a state is subject to service of process when the cause of action did not arise within
the state, and a stronger case is presented when the cause of action is not even related
to the business transacted there. Compare, in this connection, Simon v. Southern Ry.,
236 U. S. n5, 35 S. Ct. 255 (1915); Old Wayne Mut. Life Assn. v. McDonough,
204 U.S. 8, 27 S. Ct. 236 (1907); Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Selden Bieck Constr.
Co., 257 U.S. 213, 42 S. Ct. 84 (1921); and Morris & Co. v. Skandinavia Ins. Co.,
279 U. S. 405, 49 S. Ct. 360 (1929), with Louisville & N. R. R. v. Chatters, 279
U.S. 320, 49 S. Ct. 329 (1929); and Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Min.
& Mill. Co., 243 U. S. 93, 37 S. Ct. 344 (1917). See these cases discussed in l
OHLINGER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 549-550 (1938).
In the last cited case Justice Holmes held that a foreign corporation took the
risk of a construction of a statute, requiring the appointment of an agent for the
service of process, which ,vould extend the scope of the statute to include causes
of action arising outside the state. In distinguishing Simon v. Southern Ry., supra,
on the ground that no agent .had there been appointed, Justice Holmes gave
impetus to reasoning which would prefer corporations ,vhich avoid complying with the
state statute to those which do comply. It would seem that in these cases it·should not
matter ,vhether a foreign corporation appoints an agent, either a person in its employ
or an officer of the state, in compliance with the statute, or whether, without complying
with. the statute, the corporation is subject to service of process by virtue of the fact
that it is doing business within the state, service being made upon an officer of the state.
Indeed at the very time Justice Holmes drew the distinction between the situation
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from such corporations their right to remove to a federal court suits
brought against them in the courts of states where they do business.47
It is, of course, understandable why the Court did not wish to hold
a corporation to be a citizen of every state in which it does business, and
thus secure satisfaction of the venue requirements with respect to suits
brought therein.48 That would not only require the undoing of prevailing concepts of citizenship, but would involve reconsideration of
manifold ramifications of diversity jurisdiction itself.
The decision, as it stands, should help to secure the determination
of complex litigation with a lesser number of suits. Since the venue
statute must ordinarily be complied with as to each of multiple parties 49
( except in so far as relief is granted where defendants reside in different
districts or divisions in the same state50 ) , the speedy determination of
where the agent is voluntarily appointed and that where he is not, the justice described
as .fictional any consent to be served with process which a corporation might be said to
have given, even where the cause of action arose out of local business. 243 U. S. 93
at 96. He also avoided reference to the strong language used by the Court in the
Simon case, where it was said, 236 U. S. at 130: "But this power to designate by
statute the officer upon whom service in suits against foreign corporations may be made
relates to business t11td trt11tsactians within the jurisdiction of the State enacting the law,
Otherwise, claims on contracts wherever made and suits for torts wherever committed
might by virtue of such compulsory statute be drawn to the jurisdiction of any State
in which the foreign corporation might at any time be carrying on business. The manifest inconvenience and hardship arising from such extra-territorial extension of jurisdiction, by virtue of the power to make the compulsory appointments, could not defeat
the power if in law it could be rightfully exerted." (Italics supplied.) See also, Missouri Pac. R. R. v. Clarendon Boat Oar Co., 257 U. S. 533 at 535, 42 S. Ct. 210
(1922).
It is of course apparent that a decision to consider foreign corporations as residents of states where business is done would not solve the problem of whether such
corporations are subject to service of process if the cause of action arose outside the
state or was not connected with the business there transacted. If it is held that a
corporation is not subject to service in such a case, the problem of venue is unimportant.
If the corporation generally is held subject to service in such cases, it would seem a
salutary measure to permit the court to reexamine the particular situation in determining
whether the venue privilege had been waived with respect to such suits.
47 Removal in diversity cases is limited to defendants who are nonresidents of
the state where suit is brought. Judicial Code, § 28, 28 U. S. C. (1934), § 71.
48 The term "inhabitant'' is synonymous with "resident'' and "citizen." Standard
Stoker Co. v. Lower, (D. C. Md. I931) 46 F. (2d) 678. The word ccinhabitant" was
apparently used, not in any larger meaning than "citizen," but to avoid the incongruity
of speaking of a "citizen" of anything less than a state, when the intention was to cover
not only a district which included a whole state, bnt also a district covering only part
of a state. Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145 U. S. 444, 12 S. Ct. 935 (1892); l
Om.INGER., _FEDERAL PRACTICE 558 (1938).
49 Smith v. Lyon, 133 U. S. 315, IO S. Ct. 303 (1890); Camp v. Gress, 250
U. S. 308, 39 S. Ct. 478 (1919).
50 28 U. S. C. (1934), §§ II3, II4.
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litigation involving several parties and third-party practice has been
hindered and the full effectiveness of the latter procedural innovation
denied by the fact that several suits were required and perhaps complete relief unavailable in the federal courts. In so far as such proceedings are now brought in a district where a foreign corporation is
doing business, the venue problem with respect to such corporations
presents less of an obstacle.
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